Citizenship and Civic Life
The Constitution:
Its Role in Public Debate
Based on Louis Michael Siedman, ÒLetÕs Give Up on the
Constitution,Ó NYT, December 30, 2012.
Seidman is a professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown
University and author of forthcoming book, On
Constitutional Disobedience
What
is SeidmanÕs thesis?
That
invoking the Constitution stops public/political debate about issues that need addressing
Frames
them as Òconstitutional questionsÓ or limits, no-gos,
the impossible
Preventing
us from having real discussions about how we can solve contemporary problems
with the spirit of the constitution, i.e, our constitutional tradition as a whole as
our guide
Difference
between constitutionalism, following political traditions and using the
Constitution as a club to beat your political opponents into submission
Seidman traces our political history, the numerous uses of ÒunconstitutionalismÓ
Argues
that the progress of our country has often depended on overtly, explicitly
going against the Constitution
e.g.
drafting the Constitution itself, John Adams supporting the Alien and Sedition
Acts, TJÕs Louisiana Purchase, the drafting of the Civil War amendments without
the participation of Southern states, FDR pursuing the New Deal and threatening
the Supreme Court
Dissenting
justices often assert that their colleagues have ignored the Constitution, in
landmark cases, e.g. Miranda, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore
Òshould give us pauseÓ – how? Why? What are we to make of this?
Note:
He argues both interpretive methods
ÒoriginalismÓ and Òliving
constitutionalismÓ
cannot be reconciled;
some cases are decided invoking one method, others the other
Thus
we have no SINGLE tradition of interpreting the constitution
Or
rather that IS our tradition – of using it literally at times,
extrapolating at others
He
says, we shouldnÕt chuck our traditions but rather follow them out of respect
rather than obligation
HeÕs
not advocating redesign of institutional design (Òsome matters are better left
settledÓ)
ÒWhat would change is not
the existence of these institutions, but the basis on which they claim legitimacy.
The president would have to
justify military action against Iran solely on the merits, without shutting
down the debate with a claim of unchallengeable constitutional power as
commander in chief.
Congress might well retain
the power of the purse, but this power would have to be defended on
contemporary policy grounds, not abstruse constitutional doctrine.
The Supreme Court could stop
pretending that its decisions protecting same-sex intimacy or limiting
affirmative action were rooted in constitutional text.Ó
ÒWhat has preserved our
political stability is not a poetic piece of parchment, but entrenched
institutions and habits of thought, and, most important, the sense that we are
one nation and must work out our differences.Ó
ÒIf we acknowledged what
should be obvious – that much constitutional language is broad enough to
encompass an almost infinitely wide range of positions – we might have a
very different attitude about the obligation to obey. It would become apparent that people who
disagree with us about the Constitution are not violating a sacred text or our
core commitments. Instead, we are
invoking a common vocabulary to express aspirations that, at the broadest
level, everyone can embrace.
ÉIf we are not to abandon
constitutionalism entirely, then we might at least understand it as a place for discussion, a demand that
we make a good-faith effort to understand the views of others, rather than as a tool to force others to
give up their moral and political judgments.Ó
ÒIf even this change is
impossible, perhaps the dream of a country ruled by ÒWe the peopleÓ is
impossibly utopian. If so, we have
to give up on the claim that we are a self-governing people who can settle our
disagreements through mature and tolerant debate. But before abandoning our heritage of
self-government, we ought to try extricating ourselves from constitutional
bondage so that we can give real freedom a chance.Ó