Instructions

DO NOT GO BEYOND THIS PAGE UNTIL THE EXAM ACTUALLY BEGINS.

THIS IS A CLOSED BOOK EXAM! While you are waiting for the exam to begin, be sure that you have written your EXAM NUMBER on EACH bluebook, that you have read these instructions, and that you are otherwise ready to begin.

IMPORTANT: This exam will last THREE HOURS. You should plan on spending AT LEAST 20 minutes reading the questions carefully and outlining your answers on a separate sheet of paper. Before writing your answers, REREAD each question to be sure you haven't missed anything.

DOUBLE-SPACE your answers in the bluebook.

Use SEPARATE BLUEBOOKS for EACH QUESTION. Label each bluebook according to each question and, if necessary, book number, e.g., "Question 1, Book 1"; "Question 1, Book 2"; "Question 2"; etc. When you are finished, turn to the back cover of the first bluebook, and place the second, third, fourth, etc. bluebook in order inside the end of the first bluebook, so the whole makes a single package and can be read from front to back. Then put it in the box at the front.

You are welcome to use abbreviations, but indicate what they are, e.g., 'Andropov ("A") would be sued by Brezhnev ("B"), alleging that A would be liable to B ...'.

PLEASE IGNORE issues relating to legal causation; assume that any but-for cause of an injury is also a proximate cause of that injury.

Plan on spending at least 15 minutes at the end PROOFREADING your answers. You may not write ANOTHER WORD after time is called.

A STATUTORY APPENDIX is provided that gives the law of this jurisdiction, the State of Disrepair, on some issues. If no law is specified on the point you are interested in, please comment on the possible alternatives.

Each question has been assigned a point total, and the exam as a whole has a point total of 135. Spend the amount of time on each question reflecting its relative worth.

You may KEEP your copy of the exam questions if you wish.

REMEMBER THE HONOR CODE! Don't identify yourself.

DOUBLE SPACE! DOUBLE SPACE! DOUBLE SPACE!

GOOD LUCK!!!
QUESTION 1 (55 points)

Deputy Sheriff Charles Baptiste was dispatched to respond to a domestic dispute call. When he arrived at the location of the call, he was told that the person who was complained about, Dewayne Gramblett, was then at another residence. Baptiste went to the other residence and was informed by its occupant that Gramblett's presence was not wanted. Baptiste determined that there were no outstanding warrants on Gramblett, and gave Gramblett a trespass warning. At some point, Baptiste apparently became aware that Gramblett was a convicted felon. Eventually, Baptiste had the sheriff's dispatcher call for a taxi to take Gramblett to his own residence. Baptiste had the taxi summoned because Gramblett had been drinking, and because there was a flat tire on Gramblett's vehicle. Baptiste did not believe he had probable cause to arrest Gramblett. When the taxi, driven by Roger Austin, arrived at the scene, Baptiste supervised the transfer of advance payment for the ride from Gramblett to Austin.

Later, the taxi company's dispatcher called the sheriff's dispatcher, stating that he had received a call from Austin, who indicated that there was an emergency and that the passenger had taken his keys. The taxi dispatcher stated that he was unable to regain contact with Austin. Deputies began a search, and, it appears from the record, eventually found the taxi and Austin at Gramblett's residence. Austin had been stabbed to death. Gramblett, convicted of murder, testified in his deposition essentially that he and Austin had had a dispute about the fare, and that he killed Austin in self-defense with Austin's knife.

You are a new attorney in the County Attorney's Office. Assume for purposes of your analysis that the rules applied to the County are the same as those applied to the State of Disrepair. Please analyze what exposure, if any, you would face for Austin's death. Austin is survived by his wife Helena and a daughter Samantha.

QUESTION 2 (80 points)

Derrick and Susan Brutus rented a single family residence from Higinio and Luz Rodriguez pursuant to an oral agreement. On the same property with the single family residence was a concrete block shed. The shed had a door-less entry and contained a working power table-saw. Higinio Rodriguez told Derrick Brutus that he didn't want anyone entering the shed. For a period of two years Derrick and Susan, along with their daughter Claudine, complied with the defendants' warnings. As fate would have it, however, on June 23, 1998 at the age of twelve Claudine took a woodworking shop class in summer school. Wanting to get ahead on her shop class project, she entered the shed on a day when her parents were not at home. She cranked the table-saw's round control wheel, making the saw-blade rise up from its safety position under the table. She then turned on the power, activating the saw-blade, and began shaping a piece of wood. Unfortunately, on the second pass through the blade, Claudine's control of the wood lapsed and she severed the tip of her thumb. Subsequent efforts to reattach the severed portion were unsuccessful.

Claudine and her parents have come to you asking for your advice on whether or not they could recover for Claudine's injuries. Your investigation has revealed the following:

(1) When you inquired of Claudine what she knew at the time of the injury, Claudine responded that she was well aware of the dangers inherent in the use of the saw. Indeed, her shop teacher had informed her that body parts could be cut off by use of such machinery. Notwithstanding this awareness and notwithstanding that the shed
was strictly off limits to her, "just taking a chance," she made her ill-fated attempt to use the table-saw.

(2) The saw was manufactured by the Rockwell Manufacturing Co. in 1978. It was equipped with a blade guard that was designed to be placed over the saw blade when it was in operation. However, the blade guard could be removed for operation when it would make it difficult to feed certain kinds of wood into the saw blade. At the time Claudine was injured, the blade guard had been removed and was on a shelf next to where the saw was located.

Please prepare an analysis of the prospects for recovery.

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DISREPAIR STATUTES ANNOTATED
TITLE XLVI. CRIMES
CHAPTER 856. DRUNKENNESS; OPEN HOUSE PARTIES; LOITERING; PROWLING; DESERTION

§ 856.011. Disorderly intoxication

(1) No person in the state shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of another person or property, and no person in the state shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place or in or upon any public conveyance and cause a public disturbance.

(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.

(3) Any person who shall have been convicted or have forfeited collateral under the provisions of subsection (1) three times in the preceding 12 months shall be deemed a habitual offender and may be committed by the court to an appropriate treatment resource for a period of not more than 60 days. Any peace officer, in lieu of incarcerating an intoxicated person for violation of subsection (1), may take or send the intoxicated person to her or his home or to a public or private health facility, and the law enforcement officer may take reasonable measures to ascertain the commercial transportation used for such purposes is paid for by such person in advance. Any law enforcement officers so acting shall be considered as carrying out their official duty.

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TITLE XLV. TORTS
CHAPTER 768. NEGLIGENCE
PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 768.16. Wrongful Death Act

Sections 768.16-768.27 may be cited as the "Disrepair Wrongful Death Act."
§ 768.17. Legislative intent
It is the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections 768.16-768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.

§ 768.18. Definitions

As used in §§ 768.16-768.27:

(1) "Survivors" means the decedent's spouse, children, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the child born out of wedlock of a mother, but not the child born out of wedlock of the father unless the father has recognized a responsibility for the child's support.

(2) "Minor children" means children under 25 years of age, notwithstanding the age of majority.

(3) "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as money.

(4) "Services" means tasks, usually of a household nature, regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary expense to the survivors of the decedent. These services may vary according to the identity of the decedent and survivor and shall be determined under the particular facts of each case.

(5) "Net accumulations" means the part of the decedent's expected net business or salary income, including pension benefits, that the decedent probably would have retained as savings and left as part of her or his estate if the decedent had lived her or his normal life expectancy. "Net business or salary income" is the part of the decedent's probable gross income after taxes, excluding income from investments continuing beyond death, that remains after deducting the decedent's personal expenses and support of survivors, excluding contributions in kind.

§ 768.19. Right of action

When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring on navigable waters, and the event would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or watercraft that would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for damages as specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony.

§ 768.20. Parties

The action shall be brought by the decedent's personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by the injury resulting in death. When a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate. The wrongdoer's personal representative shall be the defendant if the wrongdoer dies before or pending the action. A defense that would bar or reduce a survivor's recovery if she or he were the plaintiff may be asserted against the survivor, but shall not affect the recovery of any other survivor.

§ 768.21. Damages
All potential beneficiaries of a recovery for wrongful death, including the decedent's estate, shall be identified in the complaint, and their relationships to the decedent shall be alleged. Damages may be awarded as follows:

1. Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and services from the date of the decedent's injury to her or his death, with interest, and future loss of support and services from the date of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss of support and services, the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent's probable net income available for distribution to the particular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent's services to the survivor may be considered. In computing the duration of future losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and the period of minority, in the case of healthy minor children, may be considered.

2. The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.

3. Minor children of the decedent, and all children of the decedent if there is no surviving spouse, may also recover for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.

4. Each parent of a deceased minor child may also recover for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury. Each parent of an adult child may also recover for mental pain and suffering if there are no other survivors.

5. Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or death may be recovered by a survivor who has paid them.

6. The decedent's personal representative may recover for the decedent's estate the following:

   (a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the date of death, less lost support of survivors excluding contributions in kind, with interest. Loss of the prospective net accumulations of an estate, which might reasonably have been expected but for the wrongful death, reduced to present money value, may also be recovered:

      1. If the decedent's survivors include a surviving spouse or lineal descendants; or
      2. If the decedent is not a minor child as defined in § 768.18(2), there are no lost support and services recoverable under subsection (1), and there is a surviving parent.

   (b) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or death that have become a charge against her or his estate or that were paid by or on behalf of decedent, excluding amounts recoverable under subsection (5).

   (c) Evidence of remarriage of the decedent's spouse is admissible.

7. All awards for the decedent's estate are subject to the claims of creditors who have complied with the requirements of probate law concerning claims.

8. The damages specified in subsection (3) shall not be recoverable by adult children and the damages specified in subsection (4) shall not be recoverable by parents of an adult child with respect to claims for medical malpractice as defined by § 766.106(1).

§ 768.22. Form of verdict

The amounts awarded to each survivor and to the estate shall be stated separately in the verdict.
§ 768.28. Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs

(1) In accordance with § 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. Any such action may be brought in the county where the property in litigation is located or, if the affected agency or subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued.

(2) As used in this act, "state agencies or subdivisions" include the executive departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch (including public defenders), and the independent establishments of the state; counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or municipalities, including the Spaceport State Authority.

(3) Except for a municipality and the Spaceport State Authority, the affected agency or subdivision may, at its discretion, request the assistance of the Department of Insurance in the consideration, adjustment, and settlement of any claim under this act.

(4) Subject to the provisions of this section, any state agency or subdivision shall have the right to appeal any award, compromise, settlement, or determination to the court of appropriate jurisdiction.

(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $200,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. Notwithstanding the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided herein, the state or an agency or subdivision thereof may agree, within the limits of insurance coverage provided, to settle a claim made or a judgment rendered against it without further action by the Legislature, but the state or agency or subdivision thereof shall not be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity or to have increased the limits of its liability as a result of its obtaining insurance coverage for tortious acts in excess of the $100,000 or $200,000 waiver provided above. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity before July 1, 1974.
(6)(a) An action may not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality or the Spaceport State Authority, presents such claim in writing to the Department of Insurance, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing; except that, if such claim is for contribution pursuant to § 768.31, it must be so presented within 6 months after the judgment against the tortfeasor seeking contribution has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review or, if there is no such judgment, within 6 months after the tortfeasor seeking contribution has either discharged the common liability by payment or agreed, while the action is pending against her or him, to discharge the common liability.

(b) For purposes of this section, the requirements of notice to the agency and denial of the claim pursuant to paragraph (a) are conditions precedent to maintaining an action but shall not be deemed to be elements of the cause of action and shall not affect the date on which the cause of action accrues.

(c) The claimant shall also provide to the agency the claimant's date and place of birth and social security number if the claimant is an individual, or a federal identification number if the claimant is not an individual. The claimant shall also state the case style, tribunal, the nature and amount of all adjudicated penalties, fines, fees, victim restitution fund, and other judgments in excess of $200, whether imposed by a civil, criminal, or administrative tribunal, owed by the claimant to the state, its agency, officer or subdivision. If there exists no prior adjudicated unpaid claim in excess of $200, the claimant shall so state.

(d) For purposes of this section, complete, accurate, and timely compliance with the requirements of paragraph (c) shall occur prior to settlement payment, close of discovery or commencement of trial, whichever is sooner; provided the ability to plead setoff is not precluded by the delay. This setoff shall apply only against that part of the settlement or judgment payable to the claimant, minus claimant's reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of unpaid adjudicated claims due the state, its agency, officer, or subdivision, may be excused by the court upon a showing by the preponderance of the evidence of the claimant's lack of knowledge of an adjudicated claim and reasonable inquiry by, or on behalf of, the claimant to obtain the information from public records. Unless the appropriate agency had actual notice of the information required to be disclosed by paragraph (c) in time to assert a setoff, an unexcused failure to disclose shall, upon hearing and order of court, cause the claimant to be liable for double the original undisclosed judgment and, upon further motion, the court shall enter judgment for the agency in that amount. The failure of the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within 6 months after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. For purposes of this subsection, in medical malpractice actions, the failure of the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within 90 days after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection do not apply to such claims as may be asserted by counterclaim pursuant to § 768.14.

(7) In actions brought pursuant to this section, process shall be served upon the head of the agency concerned and also, except as to a defendant municipality or the Spaceport State Authority, upon the Department of Insurance; and the department or the agency concerned shall have 30 days within which to plead thereto.
(8) No attorney may charge, demand, receive, or collect, for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 percent of any judgment or settlement.

(9)(a) No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. However, such officer, employee, or agent shall be considered an adverse witness in a tort action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function. The exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered as a result of an act, event, or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional officers shall be by action against the governmental entity, or the head of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee, unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. The state or its subdivisions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course and scope of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

(b) As used in this subsection, the term:
   1. "Employee" includes any volunteer firefighter.
   2. "Officer, employee, or agent" includes, but is not limited to, any health care provider when providing services pursuant to § 766.1115, any member of the Disrepair Health Services Corps, as defined in § 381.0302, who provides uncompensated care to medically indigent persons referred by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and any public defender or her or his employee or agent, including, among others, an assistant public defender and an investigator.

(c) For purposes of the waiver of sovereign immunity only, a member of the National Guard is not acting within the scope of state employment when performing duty under the provisions of Title 10 or Title 32 of the United States Code or other applicable federal law; and neither the state nor any individual may be named in any action under this chapter arising from the performance of such federal duty.

(10)(a) Health care providers or vendors, or any of their employees or agents, that have contractually agreed to act as agents of the Department of Corrections to provide health care services to inmates of the state correctional system shall be considered agents of the State of Disrepair, Department of Corrections, for the purposes of this section, while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in said contract or by rule. The contracts shall provide for the indemnification of the state by the agent for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter.

(b) This subsection shall not be construed as designating persons providing contracted health care services to inmates as employees or agents of the state for the purposes of chapter 440.

(c) For purposes of this section, regional poison control centers created in accordance with § 395.1027 and coordinated and supervised under the Children's Medical Services Program Office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, or any of their employees or agents, shall be considered agents of the State of Disrepair, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Any contracts with poison control centers must provide, to the extent permitted by law, for the
indemnification of the state by the agency for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this
chapter.

(11)(a) Providers or vendors, or any of their employees or agents, that have contractually
agreed to act on behalf of the state as agents of the Department of Juvenile Justice to provide
services to children in need of services, families in need of services, or juvenile offenders are, solely
with respect to such services, agents of the state for purposes of this section while acting within the
scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in the contract or by rule. A contract must provide
for the indemnification of the state by the agent for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out
in this chapter.

(b) This subsection does not designate a person who provides contracted services to juvenile
offenders as an employee or agent of the state for purposes of chapter 440.

(12) Laws allowing the state or its agencies or subdivisions to buy insurance are still in force
and effect and are not restricted in any way by the terms of this act.

(13) Every claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a
negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section shall be forever barred unless the civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint in the court of appropriate jurisdiction within 4 years
after such claim accrues; except that an action for contribution must be commenced within the
limitations provided in § 768.31(4), and an action for damages arising from medical malpractice
must be commenced within the limitations for such an action in § 95.11(4).

(14) No action may be brought against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions by
anyone who unlawfully participates in a riot, unlawful assembly, public demonstration, mob
violence, or civil disobedience if the claim arises out of such riot, unlawful assembly, public
demonstration, mob violence, or civil disobedience. Nothing in this act shall abridge traditional
immunities pertaining to statements made in court.

(15)(a) The state and its agencies and subdivisions are authorized to be self-insured, to enter
into risk management programs, or to purchase liability insurance for whatever coverage they may
choose, or to have any combination thereof, in anticipation of any claim, judgment, and claims bill
which they may be liable to pay pursuant to this section. Agencies or subdivisions, and sheriffs, that
are subject to homogeneous risks may purchase insurance jointly or may join together as
self-insurers to provide other means of protection against tort claims, any charter provisions or laws
to the contrary notwithstanding.

(b) Claims files maintained by any risk management program administered by the state, its
agencies, and its subdivisions are confidential and exempt from the provisions of § 119.07(1) and
§ 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims
arising out of the same incident, although portions of the claims files may remain exempt, as
otherwise provided by law. Claims files records may be released to other governmental agencies
upon written request and demonstration of need; such records held by the receiving agency remain
confidential and exempt as provided for in this paragraph.

(c) Portions of meetings and proceedings conducted pursuant to any risk management
program administered by the state, its agencies, or its subdivisions, which relate solely to the
evaluation of claims filed with the risk management program or which relate solely to offers of
compromise of claims filed with the risk management program are exempt from the provisions of
§ 286.011 and § 24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution. Until termination of all litigation and
settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident, persons privy to discussions pertinent to the evaluation of a filed claim shall not be subject to subpoena in any administrative or civil proceeding with regard to the content of those discussions.

(d) Minutes of the meetings and proceedings of any risk management program administered by the state, its agencies, or its subdivisions, which relate solely to the evaluation of claims filed with the risk management program or which relate solely to offers of compromise of claims filed with the risk management program are exempt from the provisions of § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident.

(16) This section, as amended by chapter 81-317, Laws of Disrepair, shall apply only to causes of actions which accrue on or after October 1, 1981.

(17) No provision of this section, or of any other section of the Disrepair Statutes, whether read separately or in conjunction with any other provision, shall be construed to waive the immunity of the state or any of its agencies from suit in federal court, as such immunity is guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, unless such waiver is explicitly and definitely stated to be a waiver of the immunity of the state and its agencies from suit in federal court. This subsection shall not be construed to mean that the state has at any time previously waived, by implication, its immunity, or that of any of its agencies, from suit in federal court through any statute in existence prior to June 24, 1984.

(18) Neither the state nor any agency or subdivision of the state waives any defense of sovereign immunity, or increases the limits of its liability, upon entering into a contractual relationship with another agency or subdivision of the state. Such a contract must not contain any provision that requires one party to indemnify or insure the other party for the other party's negligence or to assume any liability for the other party's negligence. This does not preclude a party from requiring a nongovernmental entity to provide such indemnification or insurance. The restrictions of this subsection do not prevent a regional water supply authority from indemnifying and assuming the liabilities of its member governments for obligations arising from past acts or omissions at or with property acquired from a member government by the authority and arising from the acts or omissions of the authority in performing activities contemplated by an interlocal agreement. Such indemnification may not be considered to increase or otherwise waive the limits of liability to third-party claimants established by this section.

(19) Every municipality, and any agency thereof, is authorized to undertake to indemnify those employees that are exposed to personal liability pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401 et seq., and all rules and regulations adopted to implement that act, for acts performed within the course and scope of their employment with the municipality or its agency, including but not limited to indemnification pertaining to the holding, transfer, or disposition of allowances allocated to the municipality's or its agency's electric generating units, and the monitoring, submission, certification, and compliance with permits, permit applications, records, compliance plans, and reports for those units, when such acts are performed within the course and scope of their employment with the municipality or its agency. The authority to indemnify under this section covers every act by an employee when such act is performed within the course and scope of her or his employment with the municipality or its agency, but does not cover any act of willful misconduct or any intentional or knowing violation of any law by the employee. The authority to indemnify under this section includes, but is not limited to, the authority to pay any fine and provide legal representation in any action.
§ 768.81. Comparative fault

(1) Definition.--As used in this section, "economic damages" means past lost income and future lost income reduced to present value; medical and funeral expenses; lost support and services; replacement value of lost personal property; loss of appraised fair market value of real property; costs of construction repairs, including labor, overhead, and profit; and any other economic loss which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action.

(2) Effect of contributory fault.--In an action to which this section applies, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.

(3) Apportionment of damages.--In cases to which this section applies, the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.

(4) Applicability.--

(a) This section applies to negligence cases. For purposes of this section, "negligence cases" includes, but is not limited to, civil actions for damages based upon theories of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. In determining whether a case falls within the term "negligence cases," the court shall look to the substance of the action and not the conclusory terms used by the parties.

(b) This section does not apply to any action brought by any person to recover actual economic damages resulting from pollution, to any action based upon an intentional tort, or to any cause of action as to which application of the doctrine of joint and several liability is specifically provided by chapter 403, chapter 498, chapter 517, chapter 542, or chapter 895.

(5) Applicability of joint and several liability.--Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to all actions in which the total amount of damages does not exceed $25,000.

(6) Notwithstanding anything in law to the contrary, in an action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical malpractice, whether in contract or tort, when an apportionment of damages pursuant to this section is attributed to a teaching hospital as defined in § 408.07, the court shall enter judgment against the teaching hospital on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.

§ 768.31. Contribution among tortfeasors

(1) Short title.--This act shall be cited as the "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act."

(2) Right to contribution.--

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than her or his pro rata share of the common liability, and the tortfeasor's total recovery is limited to the amount paid by her or him in excess of her or his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond her or his own pro rata share of the entire liability.

(c) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.

(d) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement or in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.

(e) A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.

(f) This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. When one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of her or his indemnity obligation.

(g) This act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.

(3) Pro rata shares.--In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability:

(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.

(b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share.

(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.

(4) Enforcement.--

(a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by separate action.

(b) When a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants, by motion upon notice to all parties to the action.

(c) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by her or him to enforce contribution must be commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.

(d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, the tortfeasor's right of contribution is barred unless she or he has either:

1. Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against her or him and has commenced her or his action for contribution within 1 year after payment, or

2. Agreed, while action is pending against her or him, to discharge the common liability and has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced her or his action for contribution.
(e) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the judgment does not impair any right of contribution.

(f) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution.

(5) Release or covenant not to sue.--When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:

(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,

(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.

(6) Uniformity of interpretation.--This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.

(7) Pending causes of action.--This act shall apply to all causes of action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors is involved and to cases thereafter filed.